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The Software Challenge
Writing software -- instructions (and data) required to operate
programmable computers, first introduced commercially during the 1950s -- has
plagued engineers, managers, and customers since the beginning of the industry.
The development process consists of requirements analysis, system design,
detailed program design, coding, testing, and installation, as well as redesign or
repairs referred to as maintenance. Yet these phases are usually more iterative
than sequential, and often unpredictable in time and costs. The productivity of
individual programmers tends to vary enormously and depend on elements
difficult for management to control, such as personal talent and experience with
particular applications.
Software producers thus encounter budget and schedule overruns as the
rule rather than the exception, especially when attempting to build large
complex systems with many components for the first time. The sheer difficulty
of software design and programming, exacerbated by a demand for programs
rising faster than the supply of software engineers, led to a situation referred
to as the "software crisis" as long ago as 1969.1 Despite years of advances in
tools (specialized programs and databases that aid in the production of other
software), design and programming techniques, and products themselves,
software has remained a most vexing challenge to all concerned, with many
problems that plagued pioneers still persisting through the 1980s.
In other industries, years of refinements and innovations have made it
possible for producers to make and customers to buy a wide range of
sophisticated products at low cost. Without modern engineering and factory
systems, for example, few people would ride in cars or use computers so
frequently. But continuing difficulties in software have led academic
researchers and practitioners alike to claim that frustrations are in part
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misguided: Writing software is and may forever remain more like an art or a
craft rather than evolve into a technology suited to the precise descriptions and
predictability of true scientific, engineering, or manufacturing disciplines.
Indeed, software appears to have characteristics that make conventional
engineering or factory operations difficult to introduce -- little product or
process standardization to support economies of scale, wide variations in project
contents and work flows, cumbersome tasks difficult and sometimes
counterproductive to divide, de-skill, or automate. What is more, software
producers have struggled to contend with constant evolution in product and
process technology as well as in customer requirements, often for programs with
unique or tailored features.
To manage such a complex technology in such a dynamic industry, many
software producers have resorted to a simple solution: They have tried to
remain flexible in structure and processes, hiring as many experienced or
talented programmers as possible and relying on small, integrated teams -- as in
job-shop or craft production in other industries. This approach takes advantage
of the greater productivity usually associated with experienced personnel, and
reduces coordination or communications problems within the project, as well as
the need to divide labor and tasks too rigidly.
In fact, job-shop or craft practices have worked well in software and no
doubt proved essential in the early days of the industry, when all products
seemed new and changing, and when programs remained small, reflecting
hardware limitations. But the software market -- demand exceeding the supply
of skilled programmers and managers, tight budgets and short schedules,
customer requirements for unique features as well as low prices and high
reliability, long-term maintenance costs surpassing those of new design work,
continual increases in the length and complexity of programs as hardware
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improves -- has created huge incentives for managers to reduce skill
requirements and systematically recycle key factors of production (methods,
tools, procedures, engineers, components) in as many projects as possible.
Thus, as the industry has evolved, loosely structured processes and craft
organizations have become inadequate to manage software, at least for many
producers. 2
Small teams working independently, no matter how well they perform or
what the individuals learn, will fail to help the firm solve problems
systematically unless management finds a way to optimize and improve
organizational skills -- not just in one project but across a stream of projects.
But, to accomplish this and still meet the demands of customers, competitors,
and the technology itself, requires firms to balance two seemingly contradictory
ends: efficiency and flexibility. This article explores how the leading Japanese
computer manufacturers have pursued this balance, not simply through the tools,
techniques, and concepts of software engineering, but through their strategic
integration and combination with an equally important element: the skilful
management of people and organizations.
The Japanese Challenge
Japanese firms have competed successfully in industries ranging from
automobiles and video recorders to industrial items like machine tools,
semiconductor chips, and computer hardware. They have become well-known for
high levels of productivity and reliability in manufacturing as well as
engineering, and for the increasing sophistication of designs. Perhaps their
most important contributions have been to exceed the efficiency of conventional
mass-production firms while introducing increasing levels of product variety and
continual improvements in products and manufacturing processes.
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If Japanese firms were to transfer the same type of skills they have
cultivated in other industries to software, which seemed likely only to grow in
importance as a technology because of its critical role in so many industries
and organizations, users might probably become better off, with improved
products at lower prices. But then the Japanese would also confront the U.S.
where Americans have not only dominated in technological invention and
innovation but, in contrast to many other industries, seemed to retain a
daunting lead over all other nations -- including the Japanese. 3
While Japanese had little international market presence in software, major
firms -- led by Hitachi, NEC, Toshiba, and Fujitsu -- explicitly took up the
challenge, first suggested in the U.S. and Europe during the late 1960s, to apply
factory concepts to computer programming in order to bring this technology up
to the standards of other engineering and manufacturing disciplines (Exhibit 1).
Yet industry analysts remain divided over where the Japanese currently stand in
the software field. On the one hand, some reports continue to claim the
Japanese are years behind the U.S. and doubt whether the Japanese will ever
duplicate their achievements in a technology like computer programming, which
is highly dependent on individual creativity and innovation, and where customers
and producers have yet to define product or process standards. Competition in
overseas markets also requires fluency in local languages and business practices
related to computer usage, as well as a surplus of personnel able to serve
foreign customers. On the other hand, some reports stress Japanese creativity
in other areas of engineering, and abilities that should benefit them in computer
programming, especially in large projects: attention to detail, effective
production management and quality control techniques, good communication and
teamwork skills, strong educational foundations in mathematics and science, and
receptivity to extensive in-house training and discipline.4 This article, based on
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a 5-year study of Japan's major software producers, offers three general
observations regarding the Japanese challenge in this industry.
First, the top Japanese computer manufacturers, which also produce most
of Japan's basic systems software (operating systems, language compilers,
database-management systems) and much of its custom applications, have made
significant progress in managing the process of software development. In fact,
a survey of 40 software projects in the U.S. and Japan, while too small to be
definitive statistically, indicates that leading Japanese companies appeared at
least comparable and possibly superior to U.S. firms in productivity, defect
control, and reusability (recycling software designs or code across more than
one project) (Exhibit 2). 5
Second, in products, the Japane', seemed comparable to U.S. firms but not
particularly threatening in foreign markets. They made large-scale, complex
software, such as IBM-compatible operating systems, telecommunications systems,
and customized industrial or business applications, including sophisticated real-
time process-control software, such as for manufacturing or power-generation
plants. But they had only begun to invent international standards or build
systems that truly pushed the state-c;-the-art in software technology. Nor did
the Japanese have a suerplus of personnel that allowed them to seek many
contract programming jobs overseas or develop standardized programs (called
packages) specifically for foreign markets. In the late 1980s, meeting domestic
demand alone remained a struggle, although firms had perfected factories that
produced tailored applications software. It appeared to be this area -- custom
programming -- that Japan might exploit for export competition in the future,
especially since Japanese firms were paying increasing attention to product
functionality and customer responses.
Third, unlike in autos and some other industries, where Japanese
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manufacturing and quality techniques departed from conventional practice in the
U.S. or Europe, Japanese software factories represented a refinement of
approaches to software engineering introduced primarily in the 1960s and 1970s.
Indeed, the very concept of the software factory, despite the greater popularity
of this label in Japan compared to the U.S. or Europe, originated in the U.S.
during the 1960s as a metaphor emphasizing the need to refine, standardize, and
integrate good ideas, tools, and techniques, such as reusability.
U.S. firms, led by International Business Machines (IBM), System
Development Corporation (SDC), and TRW Inc., pioneered variations of factory
approaches during the 1960s and 1970s, even though only SDC adopted the
factory label. Japanese firms not only adopted the word factory but launched
long-term efforts to centralize and systematize software production and quality
control, primarily to offset acute shortages of experienced programmers and
rising demand for large-scale complex programs, especially of the customized
variety. As in other industries, the Japanese emphasized process improvement
first, rather than product invention, and this corresponded to Japanese
strategies in hardware, which allowed U.S. firms to set product standards. It
was also true that these Japanese firms, similar to IBM, all had large revenues
from hardware sales and needed to produce software to sell their equipment,
whatever the costs of new programs. The Japanese, along with IBM and other
U.S. firms, thus had long-term incentives and financial resources to invest in
the systematic improvement of their software operations. Nevertheless, acting
effectively on these incentives required foresight and perseverance, as well as
considerable technical, managerial, and organizational skills -- which Japanese




But whether software producers should pursue efficiency like firms in
other industries or continue to operate as loosely-structured job or craft shops
reflects a debate dating back to the mid-1960s over the nature of software as a
technology and the appropriateness of factory or even engineering concepts for
this industry. 6 Both practitioners and academics reflected on progress in other
industries and suggested software producers adopt more engineering and
manufacturing-like practices, such as a design and production process divided
into distinct phases, with guidelines and controls for each phase, as well as
computer-aided support tools and some product construction from an inventory
of reusable parts. Managers that attempted to implement these and other ideas
associated with factory practices, such as divisions of labor, often encountered
obstacles that organizational theorists associate with the difficulty and still-
evolving nature of the industry and the technology -- suggesting that factory
operations for software were and may still be inappropriate, and thus doomed to
failure.
A few examples illustrate this argument. At General Electric (GE) during
the mid-1960s, an engineer named R.W. Bemer made numerous proposals dealing
with problems such as low and variable programmer productivity. His work
culminated in a 1968 paper encouraging GE to develop a software factory
consisting of standardized tools, a computer-based interface, and an historical
database useful for financial and management controls. This appears to be the
first published definition of what might constitute a factory approach for
software development (although GE management considered Bemer's proposal to
be premature and, in the face of strong competition from IBM, exited the
computer business in 1970, ending the company's commitment at the time to
commercial hardware and software production):
[A] software factory should be a programming environment residing
upon and controlled by a computer. Program construction, checkout
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and usage should be done entirely within this environment, and by
using the tools contained in the environment... A factory... has
measures and controls for productivity and quality. Financial records
are kept for costing and scheduling. Thus management is able to
estimate from previous data.... Among the tools to be available in
the environment should be: compilers for machine-independent
languages; simulators, instrumentation devices, and test cases as
accumulated; documentation tools -- automatic flow-charters, text
editors, indexers; accounting function devices; linkage and interface
verifiers; code filters (and many others).
While Bemer focused on standardized tools and controls, an acquaintance
of his at AT&T, Dr. M.D. Mclroy, emphasized another factory concept--
systematic reusability of code when constructing new programs. In an address
at a 1968 NATO Science Conference on software engineering, Mcllroy argued
that the division of software programs into modules offered opportunities for
mass-production methods. He then used the term factory in the context of
facilities dedicated to producing parameterized families of software parts or
routines that would serve as building blocks for tailored programs reusable
across different computers. 8 Reception to Mcllroy's ideas was mixed: It
seemed too difficult to create program modules that would be efficient and
reliable for all types of systems and not constrain the user. Software was also
heavily dependent on the specific characteristics of hardware. Nor did anyone
know how to catalog program modules so they could be easily found and reused.
These objections proved difficult to overcome, even in the 1980s, when few
firms reused large amounts of software systematically.
Another case is Hitachi. In 1969, this became the first company in the
world to centralize programming operations in a facility management formally
viewed and labelled as a software factory. New methods and controls
representing good practice in the industry improved productivity, quality, and
scheduling accuracy. But performance stagnated for the next decade as
management struggled to find the right combination of products, procedures, and
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tools. For example, because of differences in product requirements, Hitachi was
unable to introduce a components-control system (modelled after similar systems
in Hitachi's other engineering and manufacturing plants) to promote software
reusability. Management also failed to devise a single set of standards and
controls for both basic software and customized applications.
A U.S. firm, System Development Corporation, formerly a subsidiary of the
Rand Corporation established in the 1950s and since the mid-1980s a division of
Unisys, actually launched a software factory in the 1970s. The effort began in
1972 as an R&D project to develop a standardized set of software tools. After
discovering that a factory approach required more than tools alone, in 1975-
1976, the R&D team devised a standardized methodology for all phases and an
organizational structure separating sstems engineering, done by multiple teams
at customer sites, from program construction and testing, done by a centralized
group in a newly created software factory, utilizing the factory tool set. While
scheduling accuracy, budget control, and quality assurance improved for nearly
all the projects that went through the factory, the effort collapsed during 1978-
1979, for several reasons. On one major project, systems engineers did not have
the expertise to handle a new application and could not accurately specify
customer requirements to transfer to the factory. This problem, along with
difficulties in making general-purpose tools useful across different computer
systems, led SDC's chief executive to lose interest in the factory effort. At
the same time, project managers preferred to organize integrated teams of
systems engineers and programmers, rather than transferring designs to a
centralized facility over which they had no direct control. As top managers
moved or became impatient with the factory concept, and since they did not
require project managers to put work into the factory, projects returned to
previous practices and stopped sending specifications to the factory -- leaving
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the factory workers with no work.9
General Telephone and Electric (GTE) attempted to standardize around
recognized good practices but found the diversity within the organization to be
too great. As a first step, a central steering committee and laboratory issued a
set of corporate software-development standards in 1980, based on proven
methodologies and ideas from different divisions. These standards specified a
hierarchical architecture for all software systems, a formal engineering process
based on a common life-cycle model, a method for configuration management
(how to design pieces of a system and then put them together), a list of
documents for each phase, and a glossary of terms and symbols for diagramming
programs. Creation of a common process and terminology appeared to help
engineers and managers communicate, and management encountered little
opposition, at first. But, in a subsequent phase, GTE tried to standardize not
just terminology but actual practices in different divisions, through the use of
required reports to enforce adherence to standards, as well as a common tool
set. These measures failed, reflecting the variety within GTE's software
activities, the preference of engineers for familiar tools, performance problems
users encountered with the standard process and tool set, as well as conflicting
perceptions among GTE business units regarding their real needs in software. 1 0
Similar stories abound, from the U;S., Japan, and elsewhere. Programmers
in NEC's basic software division during the late 1970s rejected a new factory-
type tool and methodology set developed in central research, because it proved
to be incompatible with existing products and practices. 11 Programmers in
several Danish companies, according to a 1987 report, rebelled against the
introduction of work standards and separations of design from coding and either
quit their jobs or ignored the new rules. 12 Programmers in a major U.S.
producer of custom software at least on occasion rejected management
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regulations that they use a specified "design-factory" process and tool set,
requiring detailed specification in flow charts before actual coding. 13
To many observers, these examples evoke potentially dire conclusions:
Programmers may be too accustomed to craft-like practices, the technology too
unpredictable, and the environment too unstable, for software producers to
introduce the type of engineering and factory processes that have dramatically
improved efficiency in other industries. Furthermore, becoming more efficient
while remaining adaptable to different customer requirements and to evolution
itself, in any field, may be too difficult. It may require technical, managerial,
and organizational skills that are incompatible or at least difficult to reconcile,
especially in a dynamic industry with a complex product and process technology.
All these issues come to a head in the software field, where one could
easily argue that programming should be performed solely by highly-skilled
craftsman or professionals, who should rightly oppose attempts to de-skill or
routinize their jobs. Customer demands for tailored products also make mass-
production factories, except for the mass-replication of software packages, an
inappropriate model for this industry. But to return to an argument stated in
the beginning of this article: If a highly structured, factory process is the
wrong organizational paradigm for software developers, are other options viable?
Or must software producers always manage their facilities as loosely-structured
job shops, maximizing flexibility rather than efficiency, even though dramatic
improvements in computer hardware, and rising demand for lengthy, complex
programs, might stretch their manpower and organizational skills to the limit?
Strategic Options
Japanese firms, in approaching the management of software production,
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have followed a specific rationale: While people may argue over whether
software is more art or craft than science, engineering, or manufacturing, the
software industry, like other industries, contains different types of products and
market segments. Some customers appear sensitive to combinations of price and
performance, rather than preferring low-cost standardized products or high-cost
customized systems. Furthermore, as software systems increase in size and
complexity, ad hoc approaches to managing product development become
inadequate, in a sense forcing producers either to fail consistently in project
control or become more structured, systematic, and, to use the term
metaphorically, factory-like.
In other words, software managers, like producers in any industry, need to
realize that they face a spectrum of product and process choices. For high-end
customers, they may provide leading products, fully customized for each
application, such as complex anti-ballistic missile control systems built for the
first time. Customer requirements drive these unique systems, many of which
may involve more research and invention than predictable engineering or
production tasks. Producers in this market probably need to rely on highly-
skilled personnel theoretically capable of inventing new products, as well as
methods and tools, as needed by the application and as long as the customer is
willing to pay and wait for the result. This is a job-shop or craft approach,
suited for unique jobs. It is adequate, however, only if a small group can build
the system, if budgets, schedules, and long-term service requirements are not
too stringent, and, of course, if there are adequate supplies of skilled personnel.
Nor does a job-shop process contribute to fostering organizational capabilities
to make new types of products if each project proceeds independently.
On the opposite side of the spectrum are low-end, fully-standardized
program products or packages. Customers trade off the greater features and
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tailoring of a customized product for the lower price and immediate availability
of a package. Designing a good package might be costly and difficult, but the
potential sales are huge for a best seller, such as any one of several popular
word-processing or spreadsheet programs for personal computers. Specific
applications corresponding to needs in the mass market, rather than of one
customer, drive this type of product development. While there is no mass
production, in the conventional sense, there is electronic mass-replication of the
basic design. Yet this is a simple process and most of the real work is in the
design, construction, and testing of the product. Companies in the package
segment of the software industry, therefore, need to create product-oriented
projects as well as cultivate personnel highly familiar with both an application,
like word processing, and the cmr.-on requirements of users. Again, this
approach works well as long as a few people can build a product, skilled people
are available, and development costs are relatively unimportant compared to the
potential sales of a popular product. Once more, however, this project-centered
approach may not contribute in any way to the organization's ability to manage
a series of projects effectively.
In between these two extremes exists another option: Producers may
choose not to tailor products and processes fully for each customer or package
application, nor hire only highly-skilled people. Rather, they might seek
efficiencies across multiple projects and offer products competing on the basis
of a combination of price, performance, delivery, service, and reliability, among
other factors. Japanese software factories appeared to occupy this middle-
ground position. It turns out that producers following this strategy also did not
claim to make leading-edge products, at least not through their factories. If
customers wanted systems they had never built before, Japanese factory
managers created special projects or channeled this work to subsidiaries or
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subcontractors. Software facilities operating like factories thus focused on
familiar but large-scale programs, and tried to offer high reliability, high
productivity, and low prices. Most important, to support this strategy, they
attempted to cultivate the necessary organizational and technical capabilities
(Exhibit 3).
The appearance and appropriateness of a factory approach is not peculiar
to any one national market, as analyses of firms adopting systematic
management practices, even without the factory label, demonstrate. However,
customer preferences in specific markets may make particular approaches more
or less suitable. For example, the Japanese and U.S. computer markets clearly
exhibit differences that present different problems and opportunities for
producers. Most Japanese customers prefer large computer systems (rather than
personal computers, although this preference was changing) and products from a
single vendor; there is little demand for unique military software; most Japanese
companies have let U.S. firms establish product standards, such as for
performance and price. These market features alone create a more stable
environment than exists for producers attempting to introduce radically new
products or standards, or invent new technologies for unique applications. At
the same time, extremely high demand in Japan for custom-built but somewhat
repetitive software, rather than for packages, seems to have created huge
incentives for Japanese managers to find ways to build nominally customized
programs as efficiently as possible, through the systematic reuse of software
tools and components, as well as automated support tools to make the
customization process less labor-intensive and less dependent on highly-skilled
(and scarce) software engineers (Exhibit 4).
The factory approach also represents basic technological and organizational
strategies firms may use to structure any engineering or production process:
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Individuals, on their own or as members of a project, may use any tool,
technique, or component as a discrete element to help them design, construct,
test, or service a final product. An alternative, however, is to identify good
tools, techniques, and components that suit a series of similar projects, and
promote their use (or reuse) by adopting formal standards and process
strategies, such as to build as much of a new product as possible from a library
of existing components, systematically designed and catalogued. A company
needs to review and change standards or components periodically, as product
and process technology, as well as customer needs, evolve. Standardization in a
particularly dynamic industry, with rapidly changing product designs and
production tools, thus involves special risks. Nevertheless, managed skillfully on
an evolutionary basis, standards can provide important efficiencies and serve as
a means of communication. They can be especially valuable if problems persist
not because there are no good tools or techniques but because too many
individuals or teams operate in isolation and do not apply existing know-how
systematically.
Japanese Software Factories
Moving beyond craft practices to a factory process, and systematically
recycling reusable components, tools, methods, people, and other elements across
a series of similar projects, required years of effort and passage through
overlapping phases comparable to what firms in other industries encountered as
they grew and formalized operations. In software, however, the first step
demanded almost a heretical conviction on the part of key engineers, division
managers, and top executives that software was not an unmanageable
technology. This led to the creation of formal organizations and control
systems rather than continuing to treat software as a loosely organized service
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provided free to customers primarily to facilitate hardware sales. Imposing
greater structure on the development process then required continual efforts to
introduce and refine elements common in other manufacturing and engineering
environments but not in software, at least not in the 1960s and early 1970s: a
product focus narrower than simply "programming," to limit the range of
problems managers and programmers faced; standards, at least temporary ones
and tailored to specific product families, that introduced solutions to recurring
problems in the form of methods, procedures, and tools, as well as provided
guidelines on expected worker performance to aid budgeting and scheduling;
training of employees and managers, to standardize skills though without
specifying all tasks for all situations; and development of mechanized or
partially automated tools for design, testing, product control, reuse support,
personnel and project management, and other functions, as well as continual
refinements of these tools and methods as well as products (Exhibit 5).
Japanese firms began their transition to a factory process a few years
after IBM organized its basic software operations in the 1960s. Many other
firms in the industry containing several hundreds or even thousands of
programmers waited until the mid-1980s to move beyond project-centered,
loosely-structured organizations. Some relatively large firms, such as leading
makers of packages for personal computers and high-end producers of
apparently unique customized software, have yet to make this transition. Some
may never find factory concepts appropriate, although any firm that needs to
manage large-scale efforts and develop a series of similar products should
benefit from the historical experiences and commonalities found in Japanese
software factories.
Cases of individual Japanese firms illustrate how managers can succeed
with a factory approach -- but only if they pay greater attention to balancing
16
III
product requirements with application expertise, and allocate the time needed to
solve the array of problems that are sure to arise in any major instance of
process innovation in a dynamic industry. Why Japanese companies persisted in
their efforts whereas SDC and others did not, despite encountering similar
obstacles, also reflected differences in corporate traditions, industry and market
conditions, as well as competitive strategies.
At Hitachi, a 50-year history of independent factories for each major
product area, covering both design and production, prompted executives in the
computer division to create a separate facility for software when programming
became a major activity in the late 1960s. The fact that all Hitachi factories
had to adopt corporate accounting and administrative standards then forced
software managers to analyze project' in great detail and experiment with work
standards, new organizational structures, as well as tools and techniques, aimed
primarily at improving process and quality control. The independence of Hitachi
factories within the corporation also gave factory managers considerable
authority over products and production. While Hitachi managers underestimated
how difficult it would be to implement factory concepts such as reusability and
process standardization, Hitachi Eventually became a leader in software
production technology, especially in quality control. In the late 1980s, Hitachi
also boasted the largest software factories in Japan, housing 5000 personnel at
one site for basic software and 6000 (including both systems engineers and
programmers) at another site for applications programs (see Exhibit 1).
Toshiba created a software factory during 1977 in its industrial equipment
division to support a process strategy fundamental to conventional engineering
and manufacturing: standardization of tools and methods, and reuse of product
components. The company achieved these ends with a highly focused facility,
devoted mainly to developing real-time control software for industrial
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applications. Similarities in this type of software from project to project made
it possible to build semi-customized programs from reusable designs and code
combined with new software tailored to an individual customer's needs. Toshiba
did totally new projects outside the factory, but as demand led to repeat
projects, new software became part of a growing inventory of reusable
components and management added the new products to the factory repertoire.
In addition, Toshiba managed to generalize the factory tools and methods for
commercial sale as well as transfer to other Toshiba divisions.
Whereas Hitachi and Toshiba efforts centered on one factory in each
company, NEC attempted to structure software production for a wide range of
businesses simultaneously -- telecommunications, commercial systems software,
business applications, and industrial control systems. This presented a more
difficult challenge than Hitachi or Toshiba undertook in the 1970s, and though
the company faced many difficulties, it also made significant progress. In
addition to organizing several large facilities and subsidiaries between the mid-
1970s and mid-1980s, NEC launched a series of company-wide programs, directed
by top management and a central laboratory, to conduct process R&D as well as
standardize software-engineer;ng and management technology, and upgrade
quality controls and cross-divisional product and production planning. NEC's
broad software needs, and centralized management, forced software managers to
confront tradeoffs between standardization and flexibility almost continually.
Only one product division appears to have rejected a major tool set from the
central laboratory, although after this experience and the growing tendency of
the laboratory toward too basic research, NEC management began restructuring
to encourage a closer combination of centralized direction and R&D with more
divisional discretion.
Fujitsu began systematizing product handling and inspection procedures for
18
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basic software during the early 1970s, after Hitachi but at roughly the same
time as NEC and Toshiba. It then developed numerous procedures, planning and
reporting systems, tools, and methods, before centralizing basic software in a
large facility during 1982-1983. In applications programming, Fujitsu established
a laboratory in 1970 but moved gradually toward a more standardized, factory
approach, opening an applications factory in 1979. By the mid-1980s, compared
to its Japanese competitors, Fujitsu appeared to have the broadest assortment of
computer-aided tools supporting design and reusability, as well as the largest
number of subsidiaries available to construct designs received from systems-
engineering departments.
Other Japanese firms also adopted factory organizations and practices
during the 1980s. In particular, Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT), Japan's
primary telephone company and a large systems integrator for data-processing
and data-transmission services, had approximately 6000 software developers in
the company. It began reorganizing them in 1985 by establishing a Software
Development Division that centralized several hundred personnel formerly in
dispersed programming operations and introduced new methods and tools
emphasizing software reuse and automation. Mitsubishi Electric, a producer of
computers and office equipment, created an experimental software factory and
then reorganized approximately 700 programming personnel and engineers within
its Computer Factory to stress cost control, reusability, and tool support.
Common Elements
Each Japanese software facility differed in some respects, reflecting
differences in the products, competitive strategies, organizational structures, and
management styles of each company. Nonetheless, the factory approaches had
far more elements in common than they had in contrast, as each firm attempted
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the strategic management and integration of activities required in software
production, as well as the achievement of planned economies of scope -- cost
reductions or productivity gains that come from developing a series of products
within one firm (or facility) more efficiently than building each product from
scratch in a separate project. Planned scope economies thus required the
deliberate (rather than accidental) sharing of resources or factors of production
across different projects, such as through the reuse of product specifications
and detailed designs, executable code, software tools, methods, documentation
and manuals, test cases, or personnel experience. It appears that scope
economies helped firms combine process efficiency with flexibility, allowing
them to deliver seemingly unique or tailored products with higher levels of
productivity than if they had not shared resources.
Japanese managers did not adopt factory models and pursue scope
economies simply out of faith. Detailed studies concluded that as much as 90%
of the programs they developed in any given year, especially in business
applications, appeared similar to work they had done in the past, with designs
of product components falling into a limited number of patterns. Such
observations convinced managers of the possibility for greater efficiencies, in
scope if not in scale, and set an agenda for process improvement. Companies
subsequently established facilities focused on similar products, collected
productivity and quality data, analyzed tools and techniques, and instituted
appropriate goals and controls. Managers found ways to standardize and
leverage employee skills, systematically reuse components, and incrementally
improve process technology and standards as well as products. As the factory
cases demonstrate, Japanese firms managed in this way not simply a few
projects for a few years. They established permanent software facilities and




Commitment to Process Improvement: The managers who established software
factories all believed they could structure and improve software operations and
achieve higher, or more predictable, levels of productivity, quality, and
scheduling control. They also acted on this conviction, demonstrating a long-
term commitment to process improvement -- not as a brief experiment but as a
fundamental strategy for offsetting shortages of skilled personnel and
overcoming problems posed by defects or customer demands for unique products.
A serious commitment from top managers proved necessary, because of the need
to allocate time and engineering resources to study many projects, build tools,
train personnel, or develop reusable designs and code. It also consumed time
and money to institute policies, controls, and incentives necessary to manage
not one project at a time but a stream of projects over years, even at the
expense of product innovation or development costs for a given project.
Product-Process Focus and Segmentation: Successful factory approaches focused
at the facility or division level on particular types of software products and
gradually tailored processes (methods, tools, standards, training) to those
product families and particular customer segments, with alternative processes
(off-line projects, subsidiaries, subcontractors, laboratories) available for non-
routine projects. This product and process focus proved necessary to overcome a
major obstacle: the need for personnel to cultivate functional skills in software
engineering, such as good tools and techniques for design and testing, but, of
equal or greater importance, to accumulate knowledge of particular applications
-- critical to understanding and specifying system requirements prior to building
actual programs. Process segmentation supported this as well as allowed
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managers to channel similar work to specialized groups while sending new or
non-specialized jobs, for which the organization had no special accumulation of
skills or investment in tools, outside the factory.
Process/Quality Analysis and Control: Accumulating knowledge about products
as well as discovering the most appropriate tools, methods, or components
required extensive investment in data collection and analysis on the development
process for each product family. Achieving greater predictability in cost and
scheduling, as well as in quality (defect control proved critical because of the
high costs of fixing errors after delivery to customers), necessitated the
introduction of performance standards and controls for every phase of
engineering, testing, and project management. It remained unnecessary and
unwise to dictate the details of each task, since projects had to respond to
variations in system requirements and sometimes modify standards, tools, or
methods. However, firms could standardize personnel skills and product quality
through a product focus and a standard process, as well as training in standard
(but evolving) sets of tools, methods, and management procedures.
Tailored and Centralized Process R&D: Many software firms solved the problem
of differing product requirements and a rapidly changing technology by making
it the responsibility of each project to develop its own tools and methods. The
drawback of this approach lay in the lack of potential to exploit scale and
scope economies. Projects operating independently might built nearly identical
tools needlessly, for example, or curtail expensive tool and methodology
research to meet short-term budgets. On the other hand, firms that centralized
process R&D ran the risk of producing tools and methods unsuited to the needs
of diverse projects. Factory approaches in general established organizations for
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centralized tool and methodology R&D, above the level of individual projects;
this also raised the potential for all projects to have equal access to good tools
and techniques. To accommodate the needs of different product types, firms
tended to centralize process R&D at the product-division or facility level,
rather than at the corporate level, or use other measures, such as joint
research between central laboratories and factory engineers, to encourage the
introduction of tools and methods that actual developers found useful.
Skills Standardization and Leverage: Too much standardization of tools,
methods, and procedures had the potential to constrain an organization and
individual projects from meeting the needs of different customers or design
efforts. In particular, developers and managers needed some discretion to
tailor process technology to unforseen requirements or changes. Yet, even
without creating a fixed process for software engineering, as occurred in
rigidly controlled mass-production factories, some standardization at least
of skills, primarily through extensive training of all new recruits in a set
of standardized methods and tools, proved useful in an industry short of
experienced engineers and managers. Training in a standard process based on
knowhow gained from individual projects or from R&D helped the organization
accumulate and leverage skills across many projects systematically.
Objectives included the improvement of capabilities for process and quality
standardization as well as higher average levels of productivity, especially
from new or less experienced personnel.
Dynamic Standardization: All Japanese software factories, in addition to
imposing standards for personnel performance, methods, tools, products, training,
and other elements of operations, formalized the process of periodically
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reviewing and changing standards. Japanese facilities in the late 1980s continued
to refine tools and techniques popular in the 1970s, although with modifications
such as a stronger emphasis on building new systems around reusable
components or designs. But the policy of reviewing and revising standards for
practice and performance insured that Japanese organizations moved forward
with the technology, at least incrementally, and retained the ability to adapt to
evolving customer needs. As long as computer hardware and software
programming did not change radically, this approach provided an effective
balance of efficiency and flexibility. User and producer investments in current
hardware and software assets probably precluded radical changes for most
segments of the software industry, although R&D organizations also provided a
mechanism to monitor changes in the industry as well as generate in-house new
technologies.
Systematic Reusability: One of the major obstacles to improving productivity
and quality, as well as to accumulating knowledge of particular applications,
continued to be the unique or customized designs of many software products.
This characteristic prevented many software firms from exploiting a strategy
commonly used in other engineering and factory processes: mass production of
interchangeable components. Craft or factory producers may at any time reuse
elements such as requirements specifications, detailed designs, code, tools, or
documentation, if individuals remember what software they or other groups had
built in the past. But factory approaches took this strategy a step further by
planning and devising tools, libraries, reward and control systems, and training
techniques to maximize the writing of reusable software and the systematic
reuse of components across different projects. Design for reuse in particular
constituted an investment in an ever-expanding inventory of reusable parts. But
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reuse proved especially difficult across different kinds of software, thus making
reuse more likely within facilities focused on similar products. Again, the extra
time and money often needed to design parts for general applications (rather
than for a specific customer or function) required management planning,
controls, and incentives above the level of the individual project.
Computer-Aided Tools and Integration: Like many engineering departments and
large factories in other industries, all the software facilities described in this
book relied heavily on mechanization and automation -- specialized programs
and databases, sometimes called computer-aided software-engineering (CASE)
tools, for all phases of product development, project management and data
collection or analysis, reuse support and quality control. Good tools captured
expertise, reinforced good practices, allowed personnel to spend less time on
routine tasks (such as filing reports or coding well-structured designs), and
made it possible for relatively unskilled personnel to build complex, and
primarily unique or customized, systems. However, in Japanese factories, major
tool efforts came relatively late to the factory process and seemed of secondary
importance. Companies first strove to establish a standard engineering
methodology for each product family, and only then introduced tools to support
this methodology. To make tool usage more efficient and coordinated with an
integrated process, Japanese facilities also paid considerable attention to
integrating tools with each other as well as with standardized methods,
reinforcing both through training programs, and pursuing better tools and
methods continually through some form of RD organized above the project
level.
Incremental Product and Variety Improvement: As in other industries; Japanese
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software producers first concentrated on process and quality control and then
on improvement, in response to the challenge of producing software more
efficiently and guaranteeing product reliability to customers. Only after
demonstrating high levels of productivity and quality by the mid-1980s did
Hitachi, Toshiba, NEC, and Fujitsu turn gradually to upgrading product designs
and performance. They also spent increasing amounts of time in design rather
than in routine tasks such as coding, and expanded the variety of products they
produced in a single facility. This rise in skills and attention to product
development, which bode well for the Japanese as future competitors in
software, also drew on accumulated skills in process engineering and
management. Indeed, building large complex systems efficiently and reliably
required effective organization and management, suggesting that the assumption
of a fundamental incongruence between efficiency in process and flexibility in
products did not always hold.
* * *
The quest for an absolute answer to whether software development is or
should be managed more like an art or craft rather than like science,
engineering, or manufacturing is probably moot. This is because the nature of
software development, and the optimal process or organization, seems to depend
on the specific tasks at hand. To the extent these tasks differ with product
types, market segments, and competitive positioning, the appropriateness of
managing software through a factory process or not becomes a strategic choice
subject to management discretion. The most relevant concern for Japanese
managers has not been how to label software but how to understand and
improve its development. For this latter task -- improving the development
process -- Japan's factory efforts offered cause for reflection and presented a
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serious challenge to the belief, once common in U.S. and European firms, that
loosely structured craft or job-shop approaches constituted the most suitable
process for all software development.
In other industries, rigid automation and control, such as in the plant Ford
used to produce the Model-T car, were revolutionary but temporary steps in a
movement beyond the craft or job-shop stage. The current trends in
engineering and manufacturing, led by Japanese firms such as Toyota, leaned
toward more versatile machinery and production practices, and even relatively
skilled workers. On the surface, these seemed like steps backward from the
Model-T era, and movements closer again to the higher variety, smaller
production volumes, and higher skill requirements of craft or job-shop
production. In reality, companies had come to recognize that combinations of
efficiency and flexibility allowed them to meet various and changing customer
needs more effectively than simply maximizing one dimension (Exhibit 7).
Japanese software factories represented an attempt to move software
development beyond craft practices, such as by standardizing tools, basic
methods, and reusable components, but still allowing design engineers and
programmers the discretion they needed to build unique or tailored programs.
It thus seems a mistake to interpret the software factory as an overly
rigid mode of organization operating within the wrong paradigm, or even as a
facility requiring a certain size or centralization of operations. To understand
the true origin and character of these facilities, it is useful to recall a
comment by NEC Vice-President Yukio Mizuno, who stated that the software
factory was essentially a concept, not a thing: a philosophy that at least some
software could be produced in a manner more akin to engineering and
manufacturing than craft or cottage-industry practices. 14 While Hitachi,
Toshiba, NEC, and Fujitsu did not reinvent product designs or even the
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fundamental process technology employed in their own factories, they put
together the ideas, techniques, tools, and people -- the technology and the
organizations -- that made the factory concept work, and work better than ad-
hoc approaches used earlier.
Japanese factories also reflect a need for software managers to adopt more
of a strategic and contingency perspective -- like their counterparts in other
industries have done for many years. The factory approach might not be
appropriate for every market segment and competitive position. At the same
time, the experience of the Japanese supports another view that departs
strongly from those who would insist software development forever remain an
art or craft: Not only are more structured approaches possible to introduce,
but by not pursuing process refinements, managers may be wasting human and
capital resources, as well as an opportunity to improve the competitive
capabilities of the firm.
The software factory thus reflected neither narrowness of mind nor lack
of imagination, but a desire to leverage existing skills and affect history, to
move forward the state of a most vexing process technology. At the very
least, the type of disciplined data-collection and analysis of past and current
projects conducted routinely in Japanese software facilities provided an
accumulation of knowledge essential for continual improvement. This approach
proved essential to progress in managing this technology, as eloquently stated in
a 1980 essay on the state of the computer industry: "People built bridges that
stayed up and airplanes that flew, long before scientists discovered the
underlying mathematical principles and structures. If we want to make further
progress in software, we must go back to study what can be done and what has
been done, until we find out how to do it well....,,15
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= Operating Systems, Database Management Systems, Language
Utilities, and Related Basic Software
= General Business Applications
= Industrial Real-Time Control Applications
= Telecommunications Software (Switching, Transmission)
Notes: All facilities develop software for mainframes or minicomputers.
Employee figures refer to 1988 or 1989 estimates, based on company
interviews and site visits.
1988-1989
Est. Company Facility/Organization Products Employees
1969 Hitachi Hitachi Software Works BS 5000
1976 NEC Software Strategy Project
Furhu Works BS 2500
Mita Works RT 2500
Mita Works App 1500
Abiko Works Tel 1500
Tamagawa Works Tel 1500
1977 Toshiba Fuchu Software Factory RT 2300
1979 Fujitsu Systems Engineering Group App 4000
(Kamata Software Factory 1500)
1983 Fujitsu Numazu Software Division BS 3000
(Numazu Works est. 1974)
1985 Hitachi Systems Design Works App 6000
(Systems Engineers 4000)
(Programming Personnel 2000)
Source: Company data, site visits, and manager interviews.
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Exhibit 2: U.S.-JAPAN SOFTWARE PERFORMANCE
Note: Expressed in Means, with Medians in Parentheses ( )
U.S. Japan
(n=24) (n=16)
Average Project Size (Source Lines of Code)
343,000 433,000
(124,100) (163,700)
Mean Productivity (Fortran-Equivalent SLOC/Work-Year)
7,290 12,447
(2,943) (4,663)
Code Reuse (% of Delivered Lines)
9.71 18.25
(3) (11)




Source: Michael A. Cusumano and Chris F. Kemerer, "A Quantitative Analysis of
U.S. and Japanese Software-Engineering Practice and Performance,"
Sloan School of Management, Working Paper #3022-89, May 1989.
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Exhibit 3: Product-Process Strategies for Software Development
Product Type Process Strategy Organization Type
HIGH END:
Unique Designs Meet Customer Require-
(Full Custom, ments & Functionality
"Invention")
High-Priced Hire Skilled Workers CRAFT-ORIENTED
Premium To Design, Build Needed
Products Tools & Methods JOB SHOP
Small To Medium- No Organizational Skills
Size Systems To Perform A Series Of
Similar Jobs Or Do Large
Jobs Systematically
MIDDLE:
Partly Unique Balance Customer Needs
Designs & Functionality With
(Semi-Custom) Production Cost, Quality
Medium-Priced Skilled Workers Mainly SOFTWARE
Products In Design, Standard
Development Process FACTORY
Small To Large- Organizational Skills
Sized Systems Cultivated To Build Large
Systems And Reuse Parts,
Methods, Tools, And People
Systematically
LOW END:
Unique, Mass- Maximize Application
Replicated Designs Functionality For
(Scale Economies) Average User Needs
APPLICATION-
Low-Priced Products Hire Highly-Skilled
(Packages) Workers Knowledgeable ORIENTED
In Application
PROJECT
Small to Medium- No Organizational Skills
Sized Systems To Develop Large Products
Or A Series Of Similar
Products Systematically
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Exhibit 4: JAPAN-U.S. HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE COMPARISON, 1987
Notes: Japanese Yen converted at $1.00 = 125 Yen
NA = Not Available
Custom Software/System Integration for Japan includes consulting ($.67
billion); for the U.S. market, this category refers to contract
programming and design
Japan U.S.
Total Market $34.1 $70.4
Software Revenues/Total Market 38% 35%
Hardware Shipments $21.0 100% $45.6 100%
Large Systems 8.7 41 9.1 20
Medium Systems 3.1 15 8.7 19
Small Systems 5.0 24 8.2 18
Personal Computers 4.2 20 19.6 43
Software-Vendor Revenues $13.0 100% $24.8 100%
Total Packages 1.4 11 13.1 53
Types:
(Systems/Utilities) NA -- (5.0) (20)
(Application Tools) NA -- (3.7) (15)
(Application Packages) NA -- (4.5) (18)
Custom Software/System Integration 10.1 78 9.6 39
(Custom Software Only) (7.9) (61) NA --
Facilities Management/Maintenance 1.4 11 2.1 8
Miscellaneous Data:
1987-1992 Compound Annual Growth 17% 20%
Estimate for Software Revenues
Annual Growth in Supply 13% 4%
of Programmers
Typical Wait for Customized 26 40
Programs in Months (ca. 1984)
Computer Makers as Suppliers:
of Basic Systems Software 70% 45°6
of Applications Software 15% 5%
Sou rces: International Data Corporation, "Japan Computer Industry: Review
and Forecast, 1987-1992," January 1989; and International Data
Corporation, Computer Industry Report: The Gray Sheet, 16
December 1988, p. 3; and others.
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Phase I I l:
(Late
1970s)
Formalized Organization and Management Structure
Factory Objectives Established
Product Focus Determined
Process Data Collection and Analysis Begun
Initial Control Systems Introduced
Technology Tailoring and Standardization
Control Systems and Objectives Expanded
Standard Methods Adopted for Design, Coding, Testing,
Documentation, Maintenance
On-Line Development Through Terminals
Program Libraries Introduced
Integrated Methodology and Tool Development Begun
Employee Training Programs to Standardize Skills
Process Mechanization and Support
Introduction of Tools Supporting Project Control
Introduction of Tools tc Generate Code, Test Cases,
and Documentation










Process Refinement and Extension
Revisions of Standards
Introduction of New Methods and Tools
Establishment of Quality Control and Quality Circle Programs
Transfer of Methods and Tools to Subsidiaries, Subcontractors,
Hardware Customers
Integrated nd Flexible Automation
Increase in Capabilities of Existing Tools
Introduction of Reuse-Support Tools
Introduction of Design-Automation Tools
Introduction of Requirement-Analysis Tools
Further Integration of Tools Through Engineering Work Benches
Incremental Product/Variety Improvement
Process Reliability Control, Followed By:
Better Functionality Ease of Use
More Types of Products
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Exhibit 6: ELEMENTS COMMON TO THE FACTORY APPROACH
Across a Series of Similar Projects
OBJECTIVES:
Strategic Management and Integration
Planned Economies of Scope
IMPLEMENTATION:
Commitment to Process Improvement
Product-Process Focus and Segmentation
Process-Quality Analysis and Control
Tailored and Centralized Process R&D
Skills Standardization and Leverage
Dynamic Standardization
Systematic Reusability
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